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STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL:
CLEANING UP THE CAT’S PAW
HANNAH BANKS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Based on a fable by Jean La Fontaine and introduced by Judge
Richard Posner in 1990, the “cat’s paw” theory refers to a person who
1
is duped into action in order to accomplish another’s purpose. Within
the context of employment discrimination law, the cat’s paw theory
2
seeks to deal with the ever-changing landscape of employer liability.
As company structures change, supervisory roles and decision-making
3
capabilities often are spread out among a variety of individuals. Thus
it becomes harder for a plaintiff to bring a case of discrimination
when the person harboring discriminatory animus is not the same
4
person that ultimately makes the adverse employment decision.
5
Staub v. Proctor Hospital is an employment discrimination case
brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and
6
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). In Staub, the employee
seeks to hold his employer liable for the actions influenced by the
anti-military animus of two of his supervisors, even though neither
7
one ultimately made the decision to terminate his employment.
Although this is a USERRA case, its resolution is likely to affect the

* 2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating the
Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV.
383, 385 (2008).
2. Id. at 384–85.
3. Id. See also Brief for Petitioner at 25–26, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. July
2, 2010) (discussing the delegation of duties and separation of decision making from
investigation).
4. Befort & Olig, supra note 1, at 384–85.
5. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400).
6. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38
U.S.C.A. §§ 4301–4335 (West 2011).
7. Staub, 560 F.3d at 655.
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subordinate-liability standard for Title VII and other federal anti9
10
discrimination statutes. Due to a circuit split, the Supreme Court
11
12
granted certiorari. This is the Court’s second attempt at creating a
uniform standard for the circuits and it is likely that the Court’s
decision will seek to balance the goal of ending employment
discrimination while recognizing the problems created by the
hierarchies and intricacies of the modern workplace.
II. FACTS
Vincent Staub was employed as an angiography technician in the
Diagnostic Imaging Department of Proctor Hospital (Proctor),
13
located in Peoria, Illinois. He was simultaneously a member of the
14
United States Army Reserves. As a result of his military service,
Staub required a flexible schedule so that he could attend drill and
training obligations that occupied one weekend a month and two
15
weeks during the summer. For ten years, Staub balanced both sets of
16
responsibilities without any significant disturbance.
Staub’s employment problems began in 2000 when Janice Mulally
17
took over scheduling for the Diagnostic Imaging Department. At
that time, Mulally, second in command of the department, and
Michael Korenchuk, head of the department, resented Staub because
of his military service and took actions based on that animus that
18
resulted in his termination. As evidence of the discrimination, Staub
cites incidents in which Mulally purposefully created conflicts
between his civilian and military obligations, required him to use
vacation time for his drills, scheduled him for additional shifts, and

8. Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (West 2011).
9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Staub v.
Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. July 9, 2010).
10. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2688 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“There is a
large body of court of appeals case law on this issue, and these cases disagree about the proper
standard.”).
11. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010) (mem.).
12. See infra text accompanying note 87.
13. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
2089 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400).
14. Id. at 651.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 651–52.
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publicly posted requests for people to cover Staub’s shifts, making
19
him appear irresponsible to his coworkers.
Both Mulally and Korenchuk made discriminatory remarks about
20
Staub’s military service. Mulally stated that the extra shifts were
Staub’s way of “paying back the department for everyone else having
21
to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for the reserves” and
22
called his military duties “bullshit.” Korenchuk made similar
statements regarding Staub’s duties, calling the drill weekends “a
23
b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[’] money.”
Mulally continued to express her discontent with Staub’s military
obligations by commenting to one of Staub’s coworkers, Leslie
Sweborg, that his military duties were a “strain on the[] department,”
24
and asked Sweborg to help get rid of him.
On January 27, 2004, Staub received a written warning from
Mulally accusing him of “shirking his duties” and disappearing
25
without notice. Both Staub and one of his coworkers dispute the
26
events of the day that resulted in the warning. The warning required
him to “remain in the general diagnostic area” unless he notified
27
Korenchuk or Mulally of his plans and reasons for leaving.
On April 20, 2004, Proctor fired Staub for violating the January 27
28
written warning. Korenchuk reported that he was unable to locate
Staub during his shift, but Staub asserted that he had followed the
procedures laid out in the warning by calling to let Korenchuk know
29
that he would be in the hospital cafeteria eating lunch. Staub was
escorted to the office of Chief Operating Officer Linda Buck by
30
Korenchuk and a security guard, and was fired on the spot. Earlier
that day, Buck had already listened to Korenchuk’s complaint about
Staub’s failure to abide by the previous warning and reviewed
31
previous incidents and Staub’s file.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 652–53.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Staub filed a grievance with Proctor following his termination,
arguing that Mulally’s fabrication of the incident resulted in the
32
January 27 written warning. Buck again reviewed Staub’s personnel
file and previous reports of Staub’s problems working with other
33
Proctor employees and denied his grievance. Buck did not speak
with other current angiography technologists or investigate Staub’s
34
claim that Mulally had a military animus. Buck herself harbored no
35
animus toward Staub as a result of his status in the military.
Staub filed an employment discrimination suit based on his
36
military status under USERRA. The trial court allowed the jury to
hear all evidence of animus against Staub by Korenchuk and Mulally
and then instructed the jury under the Seventh Circuit’s cat’s paw
theory of “singular influence” that “[a]nimosity of a co-worker . . . on
the basis of [Staub’s] military status as a motivating factor may not be
attributed to [Proctor] unless the co-worker exercised such singular
influence over the decision-maker that the co-worker was basically
37
the real decision[-]maker.” The jury also was also instructed that if
the decision maker conducted an independent investigation, the
employer was not liable for the discriminatory animus of a non38
decision maker. The jury found for Staub and concluded that Proctor
had not proved that Staub would have been fired “regardless of his
39
military status.” The court denied Proctor’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law. Proctor appealed on the grounds that the district court
misapplied the singular-influence standard by allowing insufficient
evidence of non-decision maker animus and incorrectly instructed the
40
jury.

32. Id. at 655.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 654–55.
35. Id. at 655.
36. Id.
37. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 6.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089
(U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. USERRA
USERRA was enacted in 1994 to protect part-time members of
the military from employment discrimination while they continued
41
their civilian careers and fulfilled their military responsibilities.
42
Similar to the language in Title VII, USERRA states that an
employer is subject to liability if an employee’s military service “is a
motivating factor in the employer’s [adverse] action, unless the
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the
43
absence of such membership . . . .” USERRA’s definition of
employer includes “a person, institution, organization, or other entity
to whom the employer has delegated the performance of
44
employment-related responsibilities.” Courts generally interpret
USERRA according to the standards applicable to Title VII and
45
other federal anti-discrimination statutes.
B. Traditional Employment Discrimination Tests
The traditional test for determining employer liability in
employment discrimination cases originated in the Supreme Court’s
46
ruling in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, the burden is on the plaintiff to
make out a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he is a member of
the protected class; (2) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate
expectations; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against
him; and (4) circumstances exist that give rise to an inference of
47
discrimination. If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
41. USERRA, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.A. §§
4301–4335 (West 2011)).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2011) (“An unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice . . . .”).
43. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311(c)(1).
44. Id. § 4303(4)(A)(i).
45. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 21.
46. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. See id. at 802 (holding that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case “by showing (i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications”).
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case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination is established. The
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that there was a
49
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action. If this
burden of production is met, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that
the employer’s proffered reasons are only a pretext for
50
discrimination.
This standard was adapted to “mixed-motive” cases in Price
51
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Under the Price Waterhouse test, when
membership in a protected class is one of several motives for the
adverse employment action, the employer can avoid liability by
establishing the “same decision” affirmative defense—that the
adverse action would have been taken irrespective of the employee’s
52
protected status. Congress modified the Price Waterhouse decision
53
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This Act amended Title VII to
provide that “an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that [the protected characteristic]
54
was a motivating factor for any employment practice . . . .” Congress
chose the motivating factor language over alternatives (such as a
substantial factor or a substantial motivating factor) arguably to allow
55
the statute to reach a broader realm of discrimination. In order to
balance out broader employer liability, the Act also added a provision
that forbids certain types of damages and injunctive relief that places
the employee back in the job when the employer proves the “same
56
decision” affirmative defense. The Act reframed the affirmative
defense as interpreted by the Supreme Court from a liability-escaping
mechanism to one that merely limits an employer’s damages.

48. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (explaining that under
the McDonnell Douglas framework, “[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee”).
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03.
50. Id. at 804.
51. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (West 2011)).
52. Id. at 244–45.
53. Befort & Olig, supra note 1, at 399.
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).
55. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation
in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 505–10 (2006) (discussing the history behind “a
motivating factor” and how it differs from “a substantial factor”).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
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C. Agency Law in Employment Discrimination Cases
In addition to its decisions on the standards for causation, the
Supreme Court has also heard cases on the application of common
law agency principles in the employment discrimination context. In
57
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Court applied principles of
agency law and vicarious liability to a hostile work environment
58
harassment case. The Court held that under the “aided in the agency
relation standard,” an employer is “subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by
a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over
59
the employee.” The Court concluded that an employer would always
be held vicariously liable when a tangible employment action was
taken against the aggrieved employee, but liability could also exist
60
when no such action was taken. When an employee has not suffered
a tangible employment action, the employer can prove the affirmative
defense that it took reasonable measures to prevent or promptly
correct the harassment and that the employee “unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
61
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” The Court’s
reasoning relied on policy implications and the purpose of Title VII to
encourage employers to form their own procedures to eliminate
62
discrimination.
D. The History and Variations of the Cat’s Paw Doctrine
Theories of agency liability are also used in non-harassment
employment discrimination cases. Under subordinate-bias liability,
known as the cat’s paw theory, an employer may be held liable when
an adverse employment action was taken by a person who held no
animus, but was influenced or relied on information provided by a
63
biased subordinate. The cat’s paw first was used as a legal theory in

57. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
58. Id. at 764–65. See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)
(decided the same day at Ellerth and standing for the same premise).
59. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
60. Id. at 763.
61. Id. at 765.
62. Id. at 764 (with Title VII Congress sought to “encourage the creation of antiharassment
policies and effective grievance mechanisms” and the EEOC’s policy is to “encourag[e] the
development of grievance procedures”).
63. See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text.
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Shager v. Upjohn. In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the
Seventh Circuit held that a material issue of fact existed where a
committee decision could have been tainted by a supervisor’s age65
based discriminatory recommendation. The court concluded that if
the committee relied on the biased advice of the supervisor, the
committee’s own lack of animus “would not spare the company from
66
liability.”
All of the federal circuits currently recognize some variation of
67
the cat’s paw doctrine. The different tests can be grouped into three
categories: (1) the actual decision-maker standard; (2) the input or
influence standard; and (3) the causation standard. The actual
decision-maker standard is the strictest standard and is the most
68
difficult for plaintiffs to meet. Used most notably by the Fourth
69
Circuit in Hill v. Lockheed Martin, this standard requires the
subordinate to possess a “supervisory or disciplinary authority” and
be “the one principally responsible for the decision” for an employer
70
to be held liable. In other words, the subordinate must be the actual
or functional decision maker in order for the employer to be liable for
71
the subordinate’s actions. Focusing on the power of the subordinate,
this standard depends on a narrow interpretation of agency law.
The input or influence standard is the most lenient and is used in
72
some form by the majority of circuits. Under this standard, the focus
is on whether an employee with discriminatory animus provided or
73
withheld information that could have affected the ultimate decision,
74
substantially influenced the decision maker, or closely participated
64. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
65. Id. at 401.
66. Id. at 405.
67. Befort & Olig, supra note 1, at 389.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 70 and 71.
69. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004).
70. Id. at 291.
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
73. See Simpson v. Diversitech Gen., Inc., 945 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1991) (“If [the biased
official] initiated the disciplinary action . . . simply showing that [the biased official] had no role
in the ‘final’ decision is insufficient to establish that [the employer] would have made the same
decision absent the racial animus.”); Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
liability when biased supervisors “made comments critical” of the plaintiff at a hiring meeting).
74. See Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding
“comments made directly to her on more than one occasion by her immediate supervisor, who
had enormous influence in the decision-making process” to be evidence of discriminatory
animus); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that “it
is appropriate to tag the employer with an employee’s age-based animus if the evidence

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

1/31/2011 11:37:13 AM

STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL: CLEANING UP THE CAT’S PAW

79

75

in the decision making process. Although this standard varies from
circuit to circuit, it provides the lowest threshold for an employee to
prove discrimination because each court focuses on assessing the
causal connection between the subordinate’s act and the ultimate
adverse employment decision, rather than determining which
76
supervisors are covered under strict agency principles.
The intermediate standard, the causation standard, focuses both
77
on causation and agency law. In EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola, the Tenth
Circuit held that the appropriate test is “whether the biased
subordinate’s discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other
78
actions caused the adverse employment action.” Under this
standard, liability turns on causation and whether the subordinate was
79
aided in his or her action by the employment relationship. This
“aided in the action” standard from Ellerth represents a broader view
of agency principles than the “decision maker only” standard because
it attaches employer liability to a greater number of supervisory
80
employees. By focusing on actual causation, the Tenth Circuit
determined that an independent investigation by the decision maker
81
could break the causal connection. Nevertheless, the court did not
provide any clear standards as to what such an independent
82
investigation would require.

indicates that the worker possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular
decisionmaker”); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding that “discriminatory comments . . . made by the key decisionmaker or those in a
position to influence the decisionmaker” can be evidence of pretext); Griffin v. Wash.
Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that “evidence of a subordinate’s
bias is relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinate’s
influence”).
75. See Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding that the person harboring animus “participated in the decisions to suspend and
terminate” employee); Poland v Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that a
biased official made the “decision to initiate the administrative inquiry against [the employee]
and that [biased official’s] animus . . . should be imputed to the [employer]”).
76. Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t, 549 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding that when a plaintiff challenges his termination as motivated by a supervisor’s
discriminatory animus, he must offer evidence of a “causal nexus” between the ultimate
decision-maker’s decision to terminate the plaintiff and the supervisor’s discriminatory animus).
77. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 549
U.S. 1105, and cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).
78. Id. at 487.
79. Id. at 488.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. (lacking a description of what an independent investigation entails).
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The Seventh Circuit revisited the cat’s paw problem in Brewer v.
83
Board of Trustees of University of Illinois. In this Title VII case, the
court held that in order to impose liability on an employer for the
actions of a subordinate, the subordinate must have had “such power
over the nominal decision maker that she is in fact the true, functional
84
decision maker.” Because a subordinate must exert singular
influence over the decision maker, any independent investigation by
the decision maker into the employment situation bars employer
85
liability. The court explained that it “does not matter that . . . much of
the information has come from a single, potentially biased source, so
long as the decision maker does not artificially . . . limit her
86
investigation to information from that source.”
Due to the variety of standards applied by the circuits, the correct
test for determining employer liability based on subordinate bias is
ripe for clarification. Though the Court granted certiorari for BCI
87
Coca-Cola, the case was settled and certiorari dismissed. Because the
cat’s paw theory affects a variety of employment discrimination
statutes, including Title VII and USERRA, the Court most likely will
seize this opportunity to develop a uniform standard for dealing with
cases of subordinate bias.
IV. HOLDING
In Staub, the Seventh Circuit held that because there was
insufficient evidence under the singular influence theory to show that
Mulally or Korenchuk singularly influenced Buck’s decision to fire
Staub, the jury’s decision should be vacated and judgment entered for
88
Proctor. The court concluded that although the district court’s jury
instructions were “not technically wrong” about the correct legal
89
standard, the lower courts should “determine whether a reasonable
jury could find singular influence on the evidence to be presented”
and, if the evidence is insufficient, the animus of non-decision makers
90
should not be admitted.
83. Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007).
84. Id. at 918.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (mem.).
88. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089
(U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400).
89. Id. at 657.
90. Id. at 658.
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In explaining the role of the judge to keep prejudicial and
insufficient evidence from the jury, the Seventh Circuit focused its
analysis on the cat’s paw theory. Under the standard previously set
forth in Brewer, the court held again that “[w]here a decision maker is
not wholly dependent on a single source of information, but instead
conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision,
the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of
91
misinformation to the decision maker.” The court was “unprepared
to find an employer liable based on a nondecisionmaker’s animus
unless the ‘decisionmaker’ herself held that title only nominally” and
92
the subordinate was in fact the true decision maker.
The court acknowledged the military animus of Mulally and
Korenchuk, but asserted that Buck’s independent investigation into
Staub’s employment meant that a jury could not find the existence of
93
singular influence. In describing the importance of the independent
investigation, the court “admit[ted] that Buck’s investigation could
have been more robust,” but believed that the Brewer standard “does
94
not require the decisionmaker to be a paragon of independence.”
Had Staub argued in the alternative that Korenchuk was a
decision maker as well and that this was a traditional discrimination
case, Buck’s independence under the cat’s paw theory would be
irrelevant because the jury could find that Korenchuk himself, as a
decision maker, held military animus and exerted authority in a
95
discriminatory manner. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that
because Staub did not present this theory at the trial stage, the theory
was not allowed on appeal because of the uncertainty of the possible
96
jury outcome.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING
Under the Seventh Circuit’s strict singular influence standard—
developed in Brewer for cases involving animus by people other than
an official decision maker—the court’s ruling in Staub probably was
correct. It is not clear under this standard that the evidence supported
Staub’s claim that Buck based her decision solely on the word of
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 656 (quoting Brewer, 479 F.3d at 918).
Id. at 656.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 655–56.
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Korenchuk or Mulally, making them the functional decision makers.
Additionally, Staub’s personnel file included evidence of behavioral
problems with other employees that may have caused Buck to fire
him, regardless of the direct incidents that led to his termination on
98
April 20, 2004.
Although the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the singularinfluence standard to the facts of the case, the standard itself is
troubling. The standard only allows for the finding of employer
liability when the decision maker is a pawn of another employee’s
99
discriminatory motivation. It may be necessary to protect employers
from absolute liability based on third party animus, but this proemployer standard ignores both the statutory language of USERRA
100
and the realities of the workplace. Under USERRA, an employee
only needs to show that his military status was a “motivating factor”
101
in his termination. The motivating factor should not need to be
limited to the decision maker’s own animus. Instead, the motivating
factor language should be interpreted to include any action caused by
the animus of a subordinate that motivated or led to the ultimate
102
termination decision. This broader conception of “motivating
factor” is different from the singular influence standard, which
essentially seeks to impute the discriminatory motivation of the
103
supervisor directly to the decision maker. In today’s business world,
the prevalence of complex managerial structures means that the
animus of a lower ranked supervisor could influence an ultimate
employment decision, even if the higher ranked decision maker was
unaware of the animus or considered other factors. Employees should
also be protected from this type of discrimination in the workplace.
Furthermore, the court’s focus on independent investigation has
104
no basis in the statute and the elements of a sufficient independent
105
investigation are unclear. Although an independent investigation
97. Id. at 658–59.
98. Id. at 654–55.
99. See id. at 656 (“We were, and remain to this day, unprepared to find an employer liable
based on a nondecisionmaker’s animus unless the ‘decisionmaker’ . . . . just take[s] the monkey’s
word for it, as it were.”).
100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
101. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311(c)(1) (West 2011).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 161 and 162.
103. See id.
104. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 4311 (containing no language about an independent investigation).
105. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
2089 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-400) (explaining that Buck’s investigation could have been
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certainly will break the chain of causation between a subordinate’s
discriminatory animus and an adverse employment action if the
employer can prove that the same decision would have been made
106
despite the animus, this will not always be the case. The Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Staub leaves open the possibility that any
independent action on the part of the decision maker will excuse the
employer from liability—regardless of the extent and depth of the
investigation, the influence of the animus on the employment action,
and the authoritative role of the discriminatory subordinates.
VI. ARGUMENTS
A. Staub’s (Petitioner’s) and the United States’ Arguments
Staub’s argument focuses on the role of traditional agency law in
107
Staub argues that, under
employment discrimination cases.
traditional agency principals, an employer is held liable for the actions
of its employees when the employees are aided in their conduct by
their position or are performing duties that have been delegated to
108
them by the employer. The reasoning behind this principle is that
when an employer stands to benefit from the expansion of its business
through the delegation of authority, vicarious liability should attach
109
for any negligent or intentional tort that is committed by its agent.
Staub believes that agency principles are properly applied in
employment discrimination cases because a disciplinary decision
often will be the result of various smaller decisions such as “the
decision to report an employee,” “investigate an employee,” “initiate a
110
disciplinary process,” and “provide any recommendation.” The
employer’s decision to spread these responsibilities among one or
111
many employees should not act as a shield from liability.
The United States has considerable interest in this case because of
its role in creating regulations and enforcing federal antidiscrimination statutes. Due to this interest, the Solicitor General filed

more robust, but was enough because she was not under a singular influence).
106. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 56–57.
107. Id. at 16–20.
108. Id. at 23.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id. at 26–27.
111. Id.
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a brief in support of Staub and participated in oral arguments at the
112
Court’s invitation.
The arguments of the United States echo Staub’s agency
arguments. The United States advocates that “when an employer
delegates authority to a supervisor to engage in customary
employment responsibilities . . . a supervisor’s exercise of that
authority falls within the scope of the supervisor’s employment” and
when it “is exercised in a discriminatory manner and causes an
adverse employment action in violation of USERRA, the employer is
113
liable under agency principles . . . .” The United States also agrees
with Staub that under the Ellerth standard, an employer is vicariously
liable when a supervisor is aided by his agency relationship to take a
114
tangible action against a subordinate.
Staub contends that the language of USERRA is consistent with
115
these traditional agency principals. USERRA defines an employer
as including “a person . . . to whom the employer has delegated the
116
performance of employment-related responsibilities” and requires
the plaintiff to show that military service was “a motivating factor in
117
the employer’s action.” In light of these standards, the singular
influence analysis is inappropriate because Korenchuk and Mulally
are liable as Proctor’s agents with supervisory responsibilities whose
118
animus influenced Staub’s dismissal. Thus, the cat’s paw singular
influence standard is inconsistent with agency law and, if adopted by
the Supreme Court, would affect other areas of law, allowing
companies to hide behind the “good faith” ignorance of a sole
119
decision maker.
The United States further argues that the singular influence
standard is incompatible with the Secretary of Labor regulations for

112. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 130 S. Ct. 573 (2009) (inviting the Solicitor General to file a
brief expressing the views of the United States). See also Brief for the United States, supra note
9, at 2.
113. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 13.
114. Id. at 15.
115. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 22–24.
116. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4303(4)(A)(i) (West 2011).
117. Id. § 4311(c)(1).
118. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 30–32.
119. See id. at 38 (arguing that Proctor should not escape liability merely because it chose to
divide responsibilities between different levels of management).

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

1/31/2011 11:37:13 AM

STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL: CLEANING UP THE CAT’S PAW

85

120

USERRA. Under these regulations, the employee must show only
that his protected status was a motivating factor and “need not show
that his or her protected activities or status was the sole cause of the
121
employment action . . . .” The United States also emphasizes that the
singular influence standard undermines the deterrent effect of agency
principles because vicarious liability encourages employers to “select
122
their agents carefully.”
Staub argues that Proctor’s view of the cat’s paw theory focuses
123
incorrectly on the decision maker as the target of liability. The
proper question is not whether liability can be imputed to the
ultimate decision maker, in this case Buck, but whether liability can
124
be imputed to the employer, Proctor. Staub urges that it is incorrect
to focus on whether Buck was the cat’s paw of Mulally and
Korenchuk; the Court should focus on the discriminatory animus of
all agents of the employer that may have caused or influenced the
125
chain of events that culminated in the final employment decision.
Another of Staub’s concerns is that the singular influence
standard will create a policy that results in decision-making
126
capabilities being vested in a single, isolated individual. Even worse,
if an independent investigation is allowed to function as a shield
against employer liability, the decision of how thorough and
independent an investigation is largely will be decided by an
127
employer, rather than a jury. The United States argues that it will
always be difficult to determine whether the investigation has broken
the causal chain by looking at the type and source of evidence
considered, but that the investigation is “relevant only to the extent
that it sheds light on whether the supervisor’s discriminatory misuse
of delegated authority was a substantial factor in bringing about an
adverse employment action, or on whether the adverse action would
128
have been taken anyway.” Staub believes that the additional
120. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 18–19.
121. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70 FR 75246,
75250 (Dec. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002) (emphasis added).
122. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 19–20.
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 38.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 38–40.
126. Id. at 45–46.
127. See id. at 42–44 (arguing that an employer may have the incentive to minimize the
impact of certain subordinate influences in their independent investigation, but the jury can still
choose whether or not to accept those accounts as fact).
128. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 23–24.
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independent investigation defense takes the decision of whether the
129
animus was a motivating factor away from its proper place, the jury.
B. Proctor’s (Respondent’s) Arguments
Respondent Proctor’s argument is largely fact-based and focuses
on the theory that there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal
link between the animus of Korenchuk and Mulally, and Buck’s
130
ultimate decision to fire Staub. Citing standards from the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits, Proctor argues that to establish subordinate
liability, a plaintiff must show not only that a subordinate possesses
animus and participated in the employment decision, but that his
recommendation based on animus was the ultimate reason for the
adverse action, and not the employee’s actions supporting the
131
recommendation.
Proctor argues that if there is nothing an
employer can do to break the causal chain through an independent
investigation, then the deterrent effect of vicarious liability will be
132
weakened. This argument directly opposes Staub’s proposition that
the deterrent effect is strengthened when an employer is liable for the
133
discriminatory actions of its employees.
Proctor believes that insufficient evidence links the animus of
Mulally and Korenchuk to Buck’s decision and that the evidence of
134
this animus should not have been submitted to the jury. Proctor also
argues that Buck’s investigation was independent and therefore broke
the causal chain between the animus that Staub attributes to Mulally
135
and Korenchuk, and Staub’s termination. In making this argument,
Proctor emphasizes the other sources that Buck consulted in making
136
the decision to terminate Staub, the blemishes on Staub’s record
137
that were unrelated to any actions of Korenchuk or Mulally, and the
138
undisputed fact that Buck harbored no military animus. Proctor also
points out that after Staub’s termination, Staub filed a grievance and
129. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 43–44 (arguing that regardless of the testimony
of the employer regarding an independent investigation, “[a] jury, of course, would not be
obligated to accept such accounts”).
130. Brief for Respondent at 11–12, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2010).
131. Id. at 17–19.
132. Id. at 19.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 110 and 1111.
134. Brief for Respondent, supra note 130, at 31, 38–39.
135. Id. at 46.
136. Id. at 41–45.
137. Id. at 44.
138. Id. at 21.
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Buck independently reviewed his file once more, further breaking any
139
remaining causal link.
Proctor brings to light a unique aspect of USERRA: the statute
140
provides for personal liability as well as employer liability. Because
Buck had no military animus and would not be held personally liable
for her decision, Proctor contends that “if Buck as Proctor’s agent
141
cannot be held liable, Proctor cannot be liable either.” Proctor cites
various circuit court opinions that hold there can be no liability for
142
the principal when there is no liability for the agent. Thus, under the
normal vicarious liability principles, the analysis would end and
143
Proctor would not be liable. Proctor argues that the cat’s paw theory
gives employees a “second bite at the apple” when they are unable to
prove that the decision maker had any animus; it allows them to show
144
that the decision maker was actually the pawn of another. For this
reason, Proctor believes that the cat’s paw rule departs from the
traditional rules of vicarious liability by extending to situations in
145
which an agent is the dupe of a non-agent.
C. Oral Arguments
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on November 2, 2010
from Staub, Proctor, and the United States as amicus curiae in
146
support of Staub. The Court seemed to be most interested in finding
a middle ground that would allow for some subordinate liability
without exposing employers to absolute liability for the actions of
non-decision makers.
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy were concerned with the
possibility of extending liability from certain tangible employment
actions, in this case termination, to any employment action, such as a
147
negative report, by a subordinate. Justice Alito commented that
“what is made illegal are certain employer actions” and expressed a
hesitancy to extend liability beyond such tangible employment

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
2010).
147.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 60–61.
Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Staub v Proctor Hosp., No. 09-400 (U.S. Nov. 2,
Id. at 5, 21.
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actions. Justice Scalia echoed this concern by asking “why a coemployee who has a hostile motivation and makes a report to the
149
supervisor . . . wouldn’t qualify as well”? Justice Alito proposed that
the test might be “whether [the supervisor was] delegated some of the
150
responsibility for the challenged action.” Similarly, Justice Kennedy
was concerned that extending liability to non-tangible subordinate
actions would create a sweeping rule that imposed almost absolute
liability on the employer regardless of his efforts to independently
151
investigate the employment situation. Justice Kennedy suggested
applying traditional tort law to establish whether, in the case of two
actors who both contributed to a particular result, one negligent and
one not, there was a substantial contribution by the negligent actor,
152
rather than using a singular influence test.
Justice Sotomayor and Chief Justice Roberts focused on the issue
of causation. Justice Sotomayor questioned the requisite materiality
of the discriminatory animus in influencing the ultimate employment
153
decision. She asked whether the discriminatory act needed to play a
substantial role, material role, or simply any role in the adverse
employment action to be deemed a “motivating factor,” therein
acknowledging that the ultimate decision maker is not acting in a
154
vacuum and must depend on information she receives from others.
Staub explained that from the different standards articulated in Price
Waterhouse, Congress purposefully chose “motivating factor,” rather
155
than “substantial motivating factor.” The United States expressed
the view that the motivating factor language represented proximate
causation, and that the animus can be “one of many factors, but . . .
156
does need to be more than a trivial or de minim[i]s factor.”
Chief Justice Roberts questioned the extent to which an
independent intervening cause would sever the connection between
157
the subordinate’s animus and the employment decision. He also
commented that the Seventh Circuit’s cat’s paw standard of

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13, 32.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 22.
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subordinate domination over the decision maker appears to be a
“more stringent test” than the motivating factor language of the
158
statute. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsberg expressed dissatisfaction
with the independent investigation standard and the lack of guidance
for determining how detailed and thorough an independent
159
investigation must be in order for an employer to avoid liability.
Justice Breyer asked whether there should be a special rule for
subordinate liability at all, proposing to simply focus on whether an
160
act was a motivating factor or proximate cause. Rather than
attempting to analyze the motivations of the ultimate decision maker
or assess how much influence a subordinate had over her, Breyer
suggested that the correct test is to determine whether the animus was
161
a motivating factor of the action that caused the termination.
Similarly, Justice Scalia questioned whether a motivating factor refers
to the motive of the person who made the decision, or simply a factor
162
that was relevant to or influenced the decision. He indicated that
the Court might not be convinced that it refers to the motives of the
163
person who made the decision.
Oral arguments concluded with Staub suggesting that if the Court
so chose, it could decide the case on narrower principles based on the
164
purposes of USERRA. In response to an inquiry by Justice Alito,
Staub suggested that because USERRA’s animating purpose is to
“minimize the disadvantages to civilian careers that can result from
service in the military,” and because employers have an economic
incentive not to employee reservists, the Court could decide this case
by focusing entirely on purpose, thereby limiting this decision’s effect
165
on other employment discrimination statutes.
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION
Given the circuit split over the correct standard for subordinatebased employer liability and the number of federal statutes affected
by the cat’s paw theory, the Supreme Court most likely will attempt to

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 36–38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 48–50.
Id. at 47–49.
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fashion a standard that will have effects beyond USERRA. Although
Staub raised the option (in oral arguments) of deciding this case
based on the statutory purpose of USERRA alone, it is unlikely that
the Court will give up the opportunity to create a uniform rule after
missing one in BCI Coca-Cola.
In creating a uniform standard, the Court likely will look for a
middle ground between the narrow singular influence standard used
by the Seventh Circuit and the broad influence or input standard used
by several other circuits. During oral arguments, the Court seemed
dissatisfied with the extremes presented by both sides—establishing a
threshold that would be too high for most plaintiffs to meet given the
changing landscape of company policies and sizes or calling for
166
sweeping employer liability. The Court likely will base its decision
on principles of agency law, causation, and a decision maker’s
independent investigation.
Given the Court’s decision in Ellerth, the Court once again will
probably apply the agency standard that an employer is liable for the
action of a subordinate when the subordinate was aided in his action
167
by the employment relationship. Under this standard, the biased
subordinate would not need to have any official decision-making
capacity as long as he used his delegated supervisory powers to
168
influence or affect an official decision.
During oral arguments the Court questioned the level of
causation needed to establish liability. The Court seemed to consider
that the motivating factor language could refer not only to the
mentality of the biased subordinate that took the action, but also to
169
the effects of the employment action itself on the ultimate decision.
The Court appeared to reject the standard that the employer could be
held liable when subordinate bias only nominally affected the
employment decision. Rather, the justices likely will focus on
proximate causation and the materiality or substantial nature of the
170
bias in affecting the ultimate decision.
Finally, the issue of a decision maker’s independent investigation
is also likely to play a role in the Court’s decision. No clear standard

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 11.
See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra text accompanying note 162.
See supra text accompanying notes 153–156.

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

1/31/2011 11:37:13 AM

STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL: CLEANING UP THE CAT’S PAW

91

has been set for how thorough an employer’s independent
171
investigation needs to be to avoid liability. Most employment
discrimination cases are extremely fact intensive and it may be hard
to create a uniform standard that will apply to all employers given the
differences in size and organizational structures. Although it may be
easy to decide a standard based on the facts of this case, it is unlikely
that the Court will choose to rule on this case without considering the
potential effects on other cases and discrimination statutes.
As Justice Breyer suggested in oral arguments, there may be no
172
need to create a new rule for subordinate liability. If the Court
chooses to apply the same agency standards in subordinate liability as
it did in Ellerth for cases involving harassment, then the causation
standard and independent investigation problem could be dealt with
within the Price Waterhouse framework used for mixed-motives
173
cases. Under this test, the plaintiff would have the burden of
showing that the action of the supervisor was a motivating factor or
174
proximate cause of the adverse employment decision. Once this
burden is satisfied and the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the same decision
would have been made regardless of the employee’s protected
175
status. In doing so, the employer could introduce evidence showing
that an independent investigation was conducted. The fact finder
would then determine whether, within the specificities of each case,
the investigation was sufficient to break the chain of causation. The
application of the preexisting Price Waterhouse test to cases of
subordinate bias would allow more plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment, but would not create sweeping liability for employers.
Employers would still be able to win at the summary judgment stage
if the plaintiff was unable to establish that the subordinate’s bias
played a causal role in the adverse employment action.
Studies have shown that recently, fewer plaintiffs make it to trial
in employment discrimination cases and those that do succeed less
176
often than plaintiffs in previous years. Against this backdrop, and
171. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 27 (Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg questioned Proctor on what an independent investigation must consist of for an
employer to avoid liability.).
172. Id. at 34–35.
173. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
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due to the policies behind federal anti-discrimination statutes, it is
likely that the Court will choose a middle path that allows for
employees to succeed in their discrimination suits without creating
absolute liability for the employer that extends to any action by a
person not vested with decision-making authority. Although there
may still be a place for the singular influence standard in those rare
cases where the person with animus has no supervisory authority
whatsoever, the Court’s previous applications of agency law in the
employment discrimination context indicate that this strict standard is
entirely inappropriate for the more common discrimination claims
involving supervisors.

Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131–32 (2009).

